A Job That Doesn’t Need Doing - The Structural Crisis of 2009

A structural economic crisis is very different from normal economic crises. With an astonishingly accurate history, they come around just about once every 40 years. When a country slips into a structural crisis, it means that there is really nothing that can be done about it, except to plan for a new future when the crisis is finally over.


Put more simply, a structural crisis means that the way in which a country has previously built its prosperity has come to an end. This is because the country has become dependent on a certain type of industry that has become obsolete, unable to compete or can no longer grow.


The following is a timeline of structural economic crises in America over the last 120 years:


1890 - The Long Depression


For a few decades, the U.S. economy had been growing rapidly as a result of the development of natural resources and huge investments in infrastructure, most notably railroads. This ultimately made the entire economy dependent on the continuation of this rapid growth, because so much money had been invested the driving forces behind it. When the crisis came, mines, railroads, factories and farms closed on a large scale, and unemployment eventually reached close to 20%.


Fast forward 40 years:


1929 - The Great Depression


In my view, the Great Depression was caused by a combination of a tech bubble and a real estate bubble. These bubbles were inflated with the help of too much credit and speculation with borrowed money. The U.S. economy had become dependent on the continuation of these bubbles, and the high value of the stock market, and when that was no longer sustainable, everything came crashing down. The outcomes are well known: unemployment of 25%, bread lines and lost savings.


Fast forward 40 years:


Early 1970s - Oil, Gold and Manufacturing Crisis


Another classic type of structural crisis is when an industry becomes completely unable to compete, seemingly over night. This happened all over the Western world in the early 1970s in the apparel sector. Huge numbers of people used to be employed in this sector prior to this time, but Asian competitors took over the market completely. This was only a part of a series of Asian manufacturing takeovers that continues to this day.


The 1970s crisis was multifaceted, and not as severe in the short term, although it could be argued that it partly set the stage for the next crisis. The 1970s crisis also involved the end of the Bretton-Woods system and the oil embargo.


The most notable long-term outcomes in the U.S., though, was a decline in manufacturing of apparel, steel, ships and many other industrial goods, because American companies were unable to compete with imported goods. This crisis permanently changed the make-up of American employment in general, as manufacturing jobs kept getting lost (in relative terms) even after the crisis had passed.


Fast forward 40 years:


2008 - Subprime/Derivatives/Credit Crisis


Out of the three structural crises I have briefly described, the current crisis is certainly the most similar to the Great Depression. The similarities keep adding up every day, but the most striking similarity is the fundamental causes: a real estate bubble (preceded by a tech bubble), built on too much borrowing and speculation with borrowed money.


Put in other terms, the dependence on Wall Street in particular really unite these two structural crises. Speculation with borrowed money, the government’s vested interest in the continuation of the bubble, ordinary people’s reliance on the bubble itself: the situation today is almost exactly the way it was in the 1930s.

What I'm actually saying by giving the example with the 40-year cycles is that it seems that it takes 40 years for an economy to develop different types of imbalances. These imbalances can take different forms, but all lead to the same thing: a structural crisis.

For a polticial discussion, imbalances that lead to structural crises are very helpful tools in trying to figure out the best way forward for an economy. There are distinct imbalances that can develop both on the left and on the right. Today's crisis is one that developed on the right, and the crisis in the 1970s was a crisis on the left.

Put simply, when an enormous accumulation of capital occurs in the financial sector, or in an oligarchy, a severe imbalance in the economy has developed. That was the case in the 1930s as it is today. This leads to a structural crisis.

Conversely, when the government tries to steer the economy too much in an artificial way, the industry usually becomes uncompetitive. This was the case with the British auto industry in the 1970s and the Swedish shipping industry in the 1980s. This also leads to a strucutural crisis.

What we see in this pattern is another example of a political pendulum swinging back and forth. Judging by this pendulum, the next structural crisis in the U.S. will occur in 2050, and it will be a structural crisis coming from the left.



When an economic system becomes reliant on speculation alone, which is the case now and in the 1930s, I believe that the crisis will be more severe.

Before the Long Depression and the crisis of the 1970s, the U.S. had overextended itself in particular industries, but there was at least something to show for it at the end of the day. There were goods and infrastructure available that people legitimately needed, but a crisis which has Wall Street speculation as its main feature leaves only a black hole.


Financial speculation is a job that doesn’t need doing. It benefits no one in the long run. Speculation inflates bubbles that in the end do a lot more harm than good, particularly to ordinary people who don’t see them coming.


Speculation doesn’t provide a good source of funding for businesses and their new ventures, both venture capitalists and businesses can attest to that. Most importantly, as we have seen now, it can bring down an entire economy if it goes on for long enough.


Whether you are on the left or on the right, financial speculation is your enemy. I believe that the U.S. will fall into a depression either this year or in 2010. History is screaming it from the roof tops.






Moreover, I advise that the winner-takes-all voting system should be destroyed.

What Actually Caused the Great Depression?

During times of economic crises, wacky theories concerning the origin of the crisis tend to spread like wildfire. That was the case during the great depression, and that is the case now. Some people might include my theories in that category, but that is, of course, purely based on ignorance.


At present, there are literally hundreds of theories about the crisis out there, and discussions about the great depression have also resurfaced.


With respect to the great depression in relation to the current crisis, almost all the arguments can be boiled down to the following question:


Was the great depression caused by the easy access to cheap money?


As President Obama has noted, the discussion about the great depression is far from over. The factors behind that crisis are very complex, and far beyond the understanding of most politicians. Obama recently spoke in disbelief about the continued disputes over this.


There are a few things that I believe are beyond discussion:


- The stock market crash set off the depression because so many had so much invested in the market.


- The stock market crash was caused by overly inflated values of stocks.


- The overly inflated values of stocks were caused by an unprecedented amount of speculation with borrowed money.


Following this line of reasoning, the question remains: what causes speculation? If we can nail down what causes large-scale speculation, we might be able to answer what causes depressions.


More specifically, circling back to my initial question, “was the great depression caused by the easy access to cheap money?”, the question becomes:


- Does easy access to cheap money cause large-scale speculation which in turn causes depressions?


The answer to this question can be found more easily than one would think. If you can identify periods of time in history when money was cheap and abundant, and ascertain that rampant speculation always occurred during such times, you have your answer.


A quick look back in history tells us that this is not so. There have been many periods in history when borrowing money was cheap, but when speculation was minimal. This is noted in what is widely considered to be a standard work on the depression, “The Great Crash”, by John Kenneth Galbraith.


During several periods in the 19th century, cheap money was available, but without the result of large-scale speculation. This was also the case in the 1950s and 1960s. So, to say that cheap money alone causes large-scale speculation would be erroneous from a scientific standpoint.


I tend to believe that speculation can trace its roots to something far more basically human. I believe that speculation does not occur just because it CAN occur, but because there seems to be a reason to for people to speculate.


Greed is a human emotion that can never be extinguished. Everyone is guilty of it, and when a human sees an opportunity to make a quick buck without effort, whether this is prudent or not, he or she often takes that opportunity.


The most classic example of speculation is the tulip bulb speculation in Holland in the 16 Hundreds. This business went so far that a single tulip bulb could be worth an entire year’s salary at the time. What this speculation frenzy also featured were contracts with rights to buy bulbs in the future, trading fictitious bulbs that had not yet been grown, and all the other classic speculation behaviors that we see again today.


We may think we’re so advanced today, but greed, this inescapable human emotion, has already conjured up the complicated schemes of speculation many times before in the history of man.


If you can buy a tulip bulb and sell it the next day, and then not have to work for the rest of the year, who wouldn’t do that? If you can buy a house in Florida, sell it within weeks for a comparable profit, how could you resist?


In short, humans need a reason to start speculating, and in the case of the great depression, people got excited about mainly two things which will sound familiar to everyone today: real estate and new technology.


People started buying second homes to be resold shortly afterwards, and stocks in new technologies like radio and automobiles.


Speculation frenzies will probably always exist, but when such a frenzy gets out of control, it can shake the very foundations of society. When too many people start getting in to the frenzy, perhaps even the government (by relying on the stock market to provide basic public services, such as pensions, infrastructure and, of course: jobs), the country becomes utterly dependent on the continuation of the speculative bubble.


A speculative bubble can never be upheld forever, and it can never be re-inflated, so when a bubble of sufficient proportions is created, a country will not be able to avoid a depression.


In the decade before the depression, President Coolidge repeatedly praised the wonders of the stock market. In addition, most of the powerful politicians in Washington, and the members of the Federal Reserve Board, were themselves highly vested in the stock market, and were hence not at all interested in reining it in, even though they could see ominous signs.


It seemed at this time that all of America could become prosperous without any effort on the part of Washington politicians. This is extremely similar to how the Reagan, Clinton and Bush Jr. administrations operated. Hands off, hope for the best and leave the provision of American prosperity to private corporations.


Then as now, the United States was utterly dependent on the upholding of the inflated values of the stock market.


The question then becomes whether the current speculative bubble is large enough to cause a depression. I believe that the answer is, unequivocally: yes.






Moreover, I advise that the winner-takes-all voting system should be destroyed